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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RONALD DRAUGHON, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
CUNA MUTUAL INSURANCE 
SOCIETY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENTS STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CUNA's statements regarding the side effects experienced 
by Mrs, Draughon are exaggerated. Contrary to CUNA's 
representations, Dr. Border stated that Mrs. Draughon 
suffered from vomiting and muscle cramps as a result of some 
of her dialysis treatments. He was uncertain about 
hypotension stating that "she may have had hypotension."1 
More importantly, Mrs. Draughon experienced these side 
effects only infrequently. Dr. Border stated: "When I say 
suffer from them, I mean that on the average one or more of 
these side effects may have occurred every third to fifth 
dialysis, for example. They do not occur every time."2 That 
is, on average, Mrs. Draughon experienced one or both of the 
side effects once every one to two weeks. 
1
 Deposition transcript of Dr. Wayne A. Border at 31. 
2
 Id. 
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CUNA also exaggerated the side effects experienced by 
Mrs. Draughon as a result of her kidney disease. Dr. Border 
stated that she had anemia as a result of her disease. 
Again, however, he was uncertain about the insomnia and 
restlessness stating that "she may have had insomnia and 
restlessness."3 
With these exceptions, Mr. Draughon agrees with CUNA's 
statement of facts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
COUCH ON INSURANCE DOES NOT 
REFUTE THE CONTENTION THAT 
PROXIMATE CAUSE IS THE 
FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENT OF 
"MATERIAL CONTRIBUTING CAUSE." 
CUNA relies on Couch on Insurance, § 41.408, to refute 
Mr. Draughon's contention that a proximate cause standard can 
serve as the functional equivalent of the phrase at issue, 
"material contributing cause." CUNA's reliance is misplaced. 
Section 41-408 simply notes that, by judicial declaration, a 
disease can be termed a "contributing cause" of death under 
certain policy language although it does not qualify as a 
proximate cause of death under common law tort principles. 
Section 41.408 makes no reference to the phrase material 
contributing cause: 
3
 IJL. 
2 
A provision excluding liability when a 
disease, defect, or bodily infirmity is a 
contributing cause of death, in addition 
to excluding liability in cases where 
disease, defect, or bodily infirmity is a 
proximate cause of the insured's death, 
excludes cases where the disease, defect, 
or bodily infirmity is a contributing 
cause of the insured's death regardless 
of whether the disease, defect, or bodily 
infirmity is the proximate cause 
thereof.4 
CUNA attempts to discount the difference between the 
meaning of "contributing cause" and that of "material 
contributing cause" by arguing that the addition of the word 
material "merely requires that the condition which 
contributes to the insured's injury or death be important and 
not merely incidental."5 A close examination of the nature 
of the two phrases, however, reveals a significant difference 
- the difference between an objective and a subjective 
standard. 
A contributing cause can be objectively identified 
because its existence is based on observable or at least 
perceivable phenomena. Whether or not something is a 
contributing cause is not a function of the quality or degree 
4
 Citing Railway Mail Ass'n v. Schrader. (1939) 107 
Ind.App 235, 19 NE2d 887 (ulcerous condition of insured's 
stomach was not under circumstances a disease, defect, or 
bodily infirmity within meaning of this provision). 
5
 Brief of Respondent at 8. 
3 
of contribution. In the case of injury or death, either a 
cause makes a contribution or it does not. A "contributing 
cause" standard is, therefore, applied utilizing objective 
parameters. 
A material contributing cause, taking material to mean 
important, can only be subjectively identified because its 
existence is dependent on the personal judgment of the person 
deciding whether or not the contribution is important. 
Depending on how one defines the standard, the quality or 
degree of contribution are the decisive elements. Therefore, 
a "material contributing cause" standard is applied utilizing 
subjective parameters. In the present matter the standard 
was applied by a CUNA claims adjuster based on his or her 
individual value judgment, not on any empirical observation. 
The two phrases cannot be equated. Therefore, that 
Couch on Insurance notes a difference between a "contributing 
cause" standard and a "proximate cause" standard is 
immaterial and does not refute Mr. Draughon's contention that 
the court should substitute a proximate cause standard in 
place of "material contributing cause." 
4 
DATED this ^ day of October, 1987. 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Craig G. Adamson 
Eric P. Lee 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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